SOURCE: The Tribune
The noise and debate around the visit of the US President has still to die down, not just because of the inevitable hype surrounding such a visit, but also due to some unusual aspects of the whole episode. Some of these which were irrelevant to bilateral relations were nonetheless central to foreign and domestic media coverage. The other aspects are, however, perplexing and may indicate new limits to bilateral relations.
In the first category is the media tirade against President Trump for not reacting to the incidents of violence in Delhi. Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders also weighed in to castigate the President for his ‘failure of leadership’ on ‘human rights’. Clearly, politicians everywhere are not that different. Sanders would know full well that foreign leaders do not ever react to purely internal issues, particularly at a time when the situation is fluid, and details are unclear. Trump’s terse comment, ‘it’s up to India’, was, therefore, precisely right. Besides, ‘human rights’ was included in the joint statement, a concession by New Delhi that went entirely unnoticed in the media.
In addition, what should have been obvious to the meanest intelligence is that the breakout of unprecedented violence in the Capital and the Presidential visit was hardly unconnected. All the more reason to keep silent.
Meanwhile, the State Department’s Alice Wells, while supporting the Prime Minister’s appeal for peace, also chose to tag on respect for the ‘right of peaceful assembly’, in an obvious reference to Shaheen Bagh.
A second issue discussed excitedly was Trump’s statement on Pakistan. This was, unfortunately, less than exciting. In his presser, he simply talked of ‘a good relationship’ with Pakistan, and worse, again spoke of mediation on Kashmir. With the Afghan peace hanging in the balance, it was hardly likely that Trump would castigate Pakistan. Moreover, this is a President accustomed to negotiation. The harsh language on Pakistan did come, but later in the joint statement, which had the now-standard references to Pakistan and its sheltering of jihadi groups, was clearly the result of some give and take by both sides.
The media then tried to see virtue in the fact that the US chose a ‘standalone’ visit, and did not visit Pakistan. But President Obama did not stop at Islamabad either, and Delhi has made it clear to all foreign leaders that it will not welcome twinned visits. Therefore, bilaterals assessed on the positioning on Pakistan are likely to be not just misleading but also against efforts to delink ourselves from a neighbour that has a GDP that is about an eighth of ours.
A third issue refers to an understandable questioning of the substance of the whole exercise. While the visit had all the pomp and ceremony attached to such a high-profile visit (without, however, an address to the Parliament or a Townhall, as Obama did), the Ministry of External Affairs lists only three rather inconsequential agreements signed: one on medical products’ safety, one on mental health, and another on energy.
That is not a lot in terms of deliverables. George W Bush literally turned a page in the history of Indo-US ties with the nuclear deal, and Obama’s visit in 2015 set the foundation for defence cooperation.
However, the present joint statement sets out ambitious plans which include fast-tracking a deal for the construction of six nuclear reactors, a trade deal, large energy buys, and a $3-billion defence deal. It’s true that declarative intentions are often made by visiting Heads of State, with the actual deal often signed years later. The Indo-US Defence Framework, in fact, took all of two years, before it was finally inked in 2018. And, as President Trump hinted — in his own unique way — a large trade deal was expected down the line.
Yet, there’s no doubt that the joint statement was short on detail, and long on language. As both Obama and Trump found, the Prime Minister is a tough negotiator. At a time of economic stress, he’s only going to get tougher. So, don’t hold your breath.
To sum up, India-US ties may have got tougher. That’s not due to any lack of desire for cooperation. Indeed, both governments have made considerable strides, that include opening previously closed doors to technology access and India signing on to sensitive agreements, rejected earlier. Both also have a strong interest in keeping China out of the Indo-Pacific, and have not hesitated to get their security forces talking and operating together.
The trouble is, as always, about the money. Apart from that elusive trade deal, consider that the US Budget 2021 ‘ask’ for securing the Indo-Pacific is $1.8 billion. That’s a tuppence in relation to all that big talk. Look again at the policy. In every theatre, the US expects ‘allies and partners’ to pay up. The time of freebies is over.
As India struggles to find a way to pay for its defence, that kind of language is unlikely to find any takers. There’s a back-up plan, however. In 2018, the US brought forward legislation to streamline the use of private money to fund sensitive infrastructure projects, designed to profit both the investor and the recipient country. Officials estimate that about $70 trillion of private capital could be channelled into infrastructure projects in the region and outside. Such prospects could persuade our somewhat insular industrial houses to come together with their US brethren, to push back against what seems to be a bottomless Chinese purse. It’s possible.
It also needs a government that thinks differently. The Prime Minister does, as do some of his Cabinet members. It now remains for the bureaucracy to play catch-up. This could eventually become the next big break for not just India and the US, but also their partners in imaginative business.
from Indian Defence Research Wing https://ift.tt/38aEQWY
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